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BALANCING UNQUANTIFIED HARMS AND 
BENEFITS IN ANTITRUST CASES UNDER 
THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD 
The Hon. Douglas H. Ginsburg* 
William Howard Taft—the most under-appreciated 
constitutional figure since George Mason, the father of the Bill 
of Rights—is no doubt best known as the 27th President, but 
his most significant contributions to our constitutional order 
came as Chief Justice.  The federal judiciary today is the 
federal judiciary Taft gave us. During his tenure as Chief 
Justice, Taft convinced the Congress to create the Judicial 
Conference as the governing body of the federal courts; give the 
Supreme Court its own building; and, in the Judiciary Act of 
1925, eliminate most of the Supreme Court’s mandatory 
jurisdiction.1 These reforms bolstered the independence of the 
federal judiciary, and permanently elevated its role in our 
society. 
Taft also made important contributions to antitrust, both 
as a judge2 and during his time as president. Although his 
predecessor, Teddy Roosevelt, is remembered as the 
“trustbuster,” Taft’s administration brought nearly twice as 
many cases in half the time.3 As Jeff Rosen explains in his 
excellent brief biography of Taft, TR and his successor had 
diametrically opposed ideas about how best to assure the 
competitiveness of markets.4 Roosevelt championed a 
 
* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.  A version of this Article was delivered as the William Howard Taft 
Lecture, September 27, 2019, to the New York State Bar Association, 
Antitrust Law Section. I gratefully acknowledge research assistance of Jake 
Philipoom and Cerin Lindgrensavage. 
1 JEFFREY ROSEN, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 114 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Jr. & Sean Wilentz eds., 2018). 
2 See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th 
Cir. 1898). 
3 ROSEN, supra note 1, at 86. 
4 ROSEN, supra note 1, at 44, 85–86. 
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regulatory model, with strict federal oversight of large 
corporations.5 Taft favored a law enforcement model, with 
aggressive prosecution of anticompetitive conduct, bearing in 
mind that “[m]ere size is no sin against the law.”6 In my view, 
Taft’s approach was preferable and has been vindicated over 
the course of the last century. The regulatory model would have 
substituted the discretion of regulators for the decisions of risk 
takers, with distortionary and welfare-reducing effects. The 
law enforcement approach, by contrast, protects competition 
while adhering to the rule of law.7 In this Article I hope to 
continue in Taft’s reformist footsteps by suggesting some 
additional tools antitrust enforcers and courts can use to make 
coherent, evidence-based decisions in the face of measurement 
difficulties. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As then-Judge Taft recognized back in 1898, a restraint of 
trade should be condemned only if it reduces competition and 
hence consumer welfare; and we all know from cases such as 
 
5 ROSEN, supra note 1, at 85. 
6 ROSEN, supra note 1, at 86. 
7 See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Economic Analysis 
of Antitrust Consents, 46 EU. J.L. ECON. 245,  246–47 (2018). 
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Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,8 an arrangement 
may both restrain and facilitate trade and, on balance, be 
procompetitive.9 This seems obvious enough in principle, but 
in practice how are agencies and courts to assess the balance 
between the restraint or facilitation of trade or, put another 
way, the balance between the harms and benefits? I believe 
that certain tools used by agencies that do cost-benefit 
analyses before issuing regulations could help antitrust 
agencies make the required assessments.10  
In the last few years, some have questioned the propriety 
of the consumer welfare standard. There have been calls for 
antitrust enforcers and courts to consider all manner of other 
criteria in addition to the welfare of consumers.11 Doing so 
would require making complex tradeoffs among 
incommensurable goals, without any principled way to do so.12 
The effect would be to place unbridled and unreviewable 
discretion in the hands of enforcers and courts, inviting 
arbitrary decisions and creating uncertainty for firms.13 
Accepting nebulous theories of harm (such as the 
 
8 Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
9 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280–81 
(6th Cir. 1898). 
10 See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in 
Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1, 63–65 (2016) (discussing the need for more 
rigorous cost-benefit analysis in antitrust cases). 
11 See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman & Lina Khan, Restoring Competition in 
the U.S. Economy, in UNTAMED: HOW TO CHECK CORPORATE, FINANCIAL, AND 
MONOPOLY POWER 18, 23 (Nell Abernathy et al. eds., 2016) (calling for a new 
antitrust statute defining a “citizen interest” or “public interest” standard); 
Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 
600–02 (2012) (arguing that competition policy should balance consumer 
welfare against “quality of life factors,” which may include “health status, 
work and life balance, education and skills, social connections, civic 
engagement and governance, environmental quality, personal security, and 
subjective well-being”). 
12 See Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., The FTC’s Hearings on Competition 
and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, The Consumer Welfare 
Standard in Antitrust Law (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research 
Paper Series, No. 18-26, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3245912 
[https://perma.cc/HY3J-P7VJ]. 
13 See id. at 5–6. 
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“accumulation of political power”),14 and by parity of 
reasoning, vague “public interest” defenses (such as a claim 
that an agreement among rivals would reduce economic 
inequality) would lead to inconsistent results and evade the 
rule of law. This is not to deny that even under the consumer 
welfare standard, difficult tradeoffs sometimes have to be 
made, but they all involve palpable harms or benefits, not 
subjective political preferences.   
Although some critics charge that antitrust under the 
consumer welfare standard revolves solely around price 
effects,15 this is simply not the case. Other dimensions of 
competition also affect consumer welfare, including product 
quality, service, and innovation. Antitrust enforcement under 
the consumer welfare standard routinely takes these factors 
into account whenever they are likely to be significant.16 Non-
price considerations surely affect consumer welfare,17 and in 
some instances may be more significant than price effects. 
Admittedly, cases with non-price effects present a greater 
challenge for enforcers and courts because the non-price 
effects can be difficult or impossible to quantify. The 
temptation to ignore the qualitative must be resisted, 
however.18  
 
14 See Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke, A New Standard for 
Antitrust: The Effective Competition Standard: In Practice, ROOSEVELT 
INSTIT., Sept. 2018, at 8, https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Effective-Competition-Standard-issue-brief-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LU3-4YSU].  
15 See, e.g., id. at 1 (“With [the consumer welfare standard’s] price-
centric tools, the U.S. competition agencies often cannot assess how mergers 
and restraints will impact . . . quality, privacy, and innovation”). 
16 See Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious 
Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 357–61 
(2019) (discussing examples); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, 
The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 
2410 (2013) (noting “[q]uality-adjusted prices “have been part of the 
industrial organization toolkit since the early 1900s”); see also infra Part II.  
17 Cf. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Nonprice Competition, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 
83 (1993) (explaining how nonprice competition can serve as a barrier to 
collusion). 
18 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 127 (1978) 
(“Economists, like other people, will measure what is susceptible of 
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In this Article, I suggest that antitrust enforcers and 
courts draw upon the tools used by regulatory agencies and 
reviewed by courts in administrative law cases to assess the 
balance between claimed harms and benefits when one or 
more of those harms or benefits are difficult to quantify.  
Consider, for example, County of Tuolumne v. Sonora 
Community Hospital.19 There, a hospital’s privileging criteria 
for caesarian sections had the effect of foreclosing family 
doctors from 100% of the relevant market.20 The court 
concluded that this effect was outweighed by the hospital’s 
need to impose minimum standards for providers of C-sections 
in order to ensure patients’ safety.21 As this case illustrates, 
the consumer welfare standard can require an agency or court 
to make difficult judgments about the magnitude of 
incommensurate harms (here, diminished consumer health 
and safety) and benefits (viz., the price and non-price benefits 
of competition).  But the court did not even try to quantify the 
costs or the benefits; its decision was intuitive and seems 
conclusory.22 A sound theoretical framework is needed to 
ensure that the harms and benefits are quantified where 
possible, and even when one side of the ledger cannot be 
quantified, the balancing of quantified harms against 
qualitative benefits, or vice-versa, is conducted in a manner 
more certain to maximize consumer welfare.  
 
measurement and will tend to forget what is not, though what is forgotten 
may be far more important than what is measured.”); S. O’Mahony, 
Medicine and the McNamara Fallacy, 47 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS EDINBURGH 
281, 281–82 (2017) (discussing the danger of dismissing that which cannot 
be quantified).  
19 County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 
2001).  
20 Id. at 1159. 
21 Id. at 1160.  
22 Id. (“We must balance the harms and benefits of the privileging 
criteria to determine whether they are reasonable. In this case, any 
anticompetitive harm is offset by the procompetitive effects of [the 
hospital’s] effort to maintain the quality of patient care that it provides.”). 
2_2019.3_GINSBURG (DO NOT DELETE) 12/25/2019  11:20 PM 
No. 3:824] BALANCING UNQUANTIFIED HARMS AND BENEFITS 829 
II. HOW ANTITRUST AGENCIES AND COURTS 
HAVE HANDLED BALANCING  
Both the structure of the balancing inquiry and courts’ 
receptivity to qualitative justifications depend upon the 
specifics of the case. Generally, courts are willing to entertain 
qualitative justifications so long as they are based in 
consumer welfare, although courts are unlikely to bless an 
otherwise unlawful merger based upon unquantified 
efficiencies.   
A. Merger Cases 
In merger cases where there is likely to be a harm to 
competition, courts are reluctant to credit offsetting benefits, 
especially if those benefits cannot be quantified.23 In FTC v. 
H.J. Heinz Co., for example, the court approved the FTC’s 
request for a preliminary injunction against a merger between 
the second and third largest producers of baby food.24 The 
companies had argued that any anticompetitive effects would 
be overcome by production cost savings, which would be 
passed on to consumers, and by increased incentives to 
innovate and to introduce new products.25 The court found 
both arguments speculative: The parties made no effort to 
estimate the magnitude of their projected cost savings, and 
offered no data or theory to show the claimed gains to 
innovation would materialize.26   
When deciding whether to challenge a merger, agencies 
are somewhat more receptive than are courts to claims of 
offsetting efficiencies.27 They sometimes accept even hard-to-
 
23 See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health 
Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2015) (questioning viability of the 
efficiencies defense). But see FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 
1045, 1054–55 (8th Cir. 1999) (accepting argument that merger would 
improve quality of medical care).  
24 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
25 Id. at 720–24. 
26 Id. 
27 See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010). 
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quantify efficiencies, such as gains to innovation from 
combining complementary research and development 
resources, especially if the potential harm to competition 
seems slight and the efficiencies, if realized, are likely to be 
large.28  
The agencies may also consider hard-to-quantify harms, 
including harms to innovation that a merger might cause. 
Both the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (the 
“DoJ”) and the FTC have confronted this problem, but the 
FTC has brought more enforcement actions focused upon 
innovation as a key factor, no doubt because regulations 
affecting drugs and devices make it easier to identify potential 
overlaps in research and development.29     
Still, the DoJ has scrutinized some mergers based in part 
upon their potential harm to innovation.30 For example, the 
DoJ alleged harms to innovation in its complaint against the 
merger of the Dow Chemical Company and E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Company.31 The DoJ made those allegations, 
 
28 See Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris, In re Genzyme 




WJQG]; Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,, Chairman Pai Formally 
Recommends Approval of T-Mobile/Sprint Merger (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-359080A1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8SZT-2MAD] (recommending merger in part due to 
potential to advance implementation of 5G wireless technology); William J. 
Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 
207, 223 (2003) (discussing author’s experience convincing FTC not to 
challenge a merger of two companies with high market shares in part due 
to knowledge complementarities). 
29 See Ronald W. Davis, Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: 
Current Practice in Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 677, 690–93 (2003) 
(observing that “the FDA’s cooperation provides the FTC with extensive 
information on the status, approach, and likely effect of each innovation 
effort . . . that might have been difficult to obtain otherwise.”)(internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
30 See id. at 687–90. 
31 See Complaint at 19, United States v. Dow Chem. Co. et al., 2017 WL 
7118163 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-cv-01176-APM). 
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however, without quantifying the effect of lost innovation 
upon competition or consumers.32 Estimating the harm from 
reduced innovation would have shown the importance of 
innovation in the agency’s decision relative to other potential 
harms, such as the risks associated with increased 
concentration in those markets in which the parties 
competed.33 
Merger cases rarely make it to trial,34 so the antitrust 
agencies have considerable flexibility to consider unquantified 
harms to innovation without the need rigorously to 
demonstrate them to the satisfaction of a court. For example, 
when pharmaceutical companies Genentech, Inc. and Roche 
proposed to merge, the FTC required divestitures in part due 
to concerns about the potential harm to innovation,35 although 
the agency did not quantify the potential harm. Had it done 
so, the present value of that harm presumably would have 
been discounted because, by the FTC’s own reckoning, the 
companies would not have been competing against each other 
in some of the relevant markets for several years.36 
It is unclear whether courts would be as skeptical about an 
agency’s claim that a merger would harm innovation as they 
seem to be about firms’ claims that their merger would spur 
innovation. Quantifying the alleged harms to innovation could 
help an agency both in deciding whether to oppose a merger 
and in supporting its allegations in court. In pharmaceutical 
mergers, for example, the agency would be more credible if it 
discounted the potential harm from overlaps in drug 
 
32 See id. at 11–12, 16–17. 
33 See Competitive Impact Statement of Plaintiff at 10, 15, United 
States v. Dow Chem. Co. et al., 2017 WL 7118163 (D.D.C 2017) (No. 17-cv-
01176-APM) (estimating The Dow Chemical Company and E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Company together accounted for nearly 75% of the market for 
chewing pest insecticides and over 99% of the market for acid copolymers in 
the United States).  
34  FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANN. 
REP. 1–4 (2018).  
35 See Roche Holding Ltd., 113 F.T.C. 1086, 1088–89 (1990). 
36 See id. at 1108 (dissenting statement). 
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development by the estimated probability that both drugs 
would ever make it to market.37 
B. Horizontal Restraints 
Courts are more receptive to qualitative justifications for 
horizontal restraints than they are to qualitative 
justifications for otherwise harmful mergers. Often the 
accepted justifications are clearly tied to consumer welfare, 
even when the benefits to consumers cannot be measured in 
dollars.38 For example, in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, the 
Ninth Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court, had to 
apply the rule of reason to advertising restrictions that limited 
the claims dentists could make about the price or quality of 
their services.39 The court first concluded the restrictions had 
an anticompetitive effect because they suppressed truthful 
advertising.40 The Dental Association then argued the 
restrictions were procompetitive and necessary to correct 
information asymmetries and avoid misleading consumers. 
Neither side tried to quantify the effects it instanced.41 
Because the procompetitive justifications for the restrictions 
were supported by expert testimony by both economists and 
dentists regarding the California dental market, while the 
alleged anticompetitive effects were supported primarily by a 
study of advertising restrictions in the legal services market, 
the court held the FTC had not met its burden of showing a 
net anticompetitive effect.42 
 
37 See Ilene Knable Gotts & Richard T. Rapp, Antitrust Treatment of 
Mergers Involving Future Goods, ANTITRUST, Fall 2004, at 100, 101. 
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2004/Antitrust_Maga
zine_Fall_2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/82XD-RSQE] (arguing that antitrust 
enforcers should be wary of forecasting harm in markets for goods that do 
not yet exist, as the FTC did in Genentech). 
38 See e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
103, 117 (1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1979); 
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 952–53 (9th Cir. 2000). 
39 224 F.3d at 943–45, 947. 
40 Id. at 949. 
41 See id. at 957–58. 
42 Id. 
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Sports leagues provide many examples of courts weighing 
qualitative arguments in favor of potentially anticompetitive 
restraints. Courts routinely accept the maintenance of a 
“competitive balance” among teams as a justification for 
league rules,43 although the incremental contribution of any 
particular rule to competitive balance, and the resulting 
contribution to consumer welfare, may be nearly impossible to 
quantify.44 The courts are on solid ground, however; it is 
intuitively obvious that maintaining a healthy balance among 
teams improves the quality of league competition by making 
games closer and season outcomes less predictable, which 
makes the competition more attractive to fans.45 In NCAA v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, where the 
Supreme Court first accepted competitive balance as a 
cognizable benefit to consumers, the Court explained that 
league rules are often justifiable as output-increasing 
horizontal restraints, much like the restraint it had seen in 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc.46 More controversially, at least one court has also 
accepted certain NCAA rules prohibiting compensation as 
necessary to maintain the member schools’ tradition of 
amateurism, which it deemed output enhancing (by 
increasing the appeal of collegiate sports to consumers).47 
 
43 See, e.g., Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 
290, 328 (2d Cir. 2008). 
44 See Andrew S. Zimbalist, Competitive Balance in Sports Leagues: An 
Introduction, 3 J. SPORTS ECON. 111, 119–20 (2002) (“The complexity of 
factors affecting competitive balance is daunting.”). 
45 See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175–76 (D.C. Cir. 
1978); Peter Kreher, Antitrust Theory, College Sports, and Interleague 
Rulemaking: A New Critique of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules, 6 VA. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 51, 58–59 (2006); Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the 
Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on 
Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219, 272 n.180 (1984). 
46 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103, 117 
(1984) (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)). 
47 See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
NCAA’s compensation rules serve the two procompetitive purposes 
identified by the district court: integrating academics with athletics, and 
‘preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product by promoting its current 
understanding of amateurism.’”) (quoting O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 
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C. Non-competition Justifications 
Only one U.S. court has been receptive to an unquantified 
justification that had nothing to do with competition. In 
United States v. Brown University, the Third Circuit reversed 
a district court’s “quick look” review of an agreement among 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Ivy League 
schools not to award merit scholarships and to offer each 
student admitted to more than one school the same amount of 
need-based financial aid.48 Among the schools’ justifications 
was the claim that their agreement promoted “the social ideal 
of equality of educational access and opportunity”; by not 
awarding merit aid, the schools were able to support more 
students who were otherwise financially unable to attend.49 In 
the district court’s view, promotion of equality was a non-
economic benefit of the agreement, which it could not properly 
consider.50 The Third Circuit, however, held that this non-
economic justification had to be evaluated as part of a full rule 
of reason analysis.51 After the appeal, the parties settled, but 
then the Congress granted the schools an exemption from the 
antitrust laws to coordinate financial aid awards.52 Despite its 
ratification by the Congress, the Brown University case is an 
outlier in U.S.  antitrust law, which generally does not accept 
a justification for restraining trade that is untethered to 
consumer welfare.53 
 
955, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). See also In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap 
Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (accepting that 
some limits on student-athlete compensation could be procompetitive, but 
striking down the compensation limits at issue). 
48 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 661–63 (3d. Cir. 1993). 
49 Id. at 674–75. 
50 United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1992), 
rev'd, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
51 5 F.3d at 678. 
52  Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 
568(a)–(d), 108 Stat. 3518, 4060–61 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2012)). 
53 See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
695 (1978) (rejecting a non-competition justification for a horizontal 
restraint as “a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act”). 
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The practice of accepting justifications untethered to 
consumer welfare is somewhat more prevalent overseas, in 
developed54 and particularly in developing countries. The 
competition law of South Africa, for example, mandates 
consideration of several non-competition factors, such as 
employment and opportunities for local businesses.55 The 
South African Competition Tribunal conditioned the merger 
of Walmart and local retailer Massmart upon the merged firm 
investing in the development of small and medium-sized local 
suppliers and training local suppliers to do business with it.56 
European competition authorities may, though rarely do, 
consider non-competition justifications under the exemption 
criteria in Article 101(3) of the Treaty.57 The prohibitions of 
Article 101 “may . . .  be declared inapplicable” to agreements 
and concerted practices that (1) improve the production or 
distribution of goods, or promote technical or economic 
progress, provided (2) consumers receive a fair share of the 
benefit, and (3) the restrictions are indispensable to 
attainment of the benefits and (4) do not eliminate 
competition with respect to a substantial part of the relevant 
market.58  
 
54 See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. 
and E.U. Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2512 (2013) 
(explaining that E.U. competition law has multiple goals, including “concern 
for competitors . . . and the functioning of the internal market”); 
NETHERLANDS AUTH. FOR CONSUMERS & MKTS., VISION DOCUMENT: 
COMPETITION & SUSTAINABILITY 3 (2014), 
https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/13077/Vision-document-on-
Competition-and-Sustainability [https://perma.cc/8L3G-9JQY] (clarifying 
that Dutch competition rules offer room for cooperation with regard to 
environmental sustainability).  
55 Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 2 (S. Afr.) (listing purposes to include 
promotion of employment and social welfare, expanding opportunities for 
South African participation in world markets, and increasing ownership 
stakes for historically disadvantaged persons).  
56 SA Competition Commission Working Paper CC2016/03 An Ex-Post 
Review of the Wal-Mart/Massmart Merger (Nov. 2016) (S. Afr.). 
57 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101,  May 9, 
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 88–89.  
58  Id. 
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In one case, the European Commission approved an 
agreement among “virtually all” manufacturers of washing 
machines to stop producing and importing the least energy-
efficient models.59 The Commission was able to quantify a 
likely increase in production costs, which it acknowledged 
would lead to price increases.60 Although it recognized the 
agreement would restrict competition, the Commission held it 
met the conditions for an exemption because, among other 
reasons, it was likely to reduce electricity consumption to the 
point that consumers would be able to recoup the increased 
price within a reasonable time.61 The Commission also 
considered the benefits of reduced carbon emissions, which it 
estimated would be seven times larger than the competitive 
harm.62 
Under any rigorous application of the consumer welfare 
standard, it is logically necessary to consider hard-to-quantify 
aspects of competition, but that is no reason for a competition 
agency to weigh “public interest” considerations untethered to 
competition and consumer welfare. It is also logically 
necessary to consider the second order or ripple effects of a 
restraint or merger upon the welfare of all consumers, 
whether in the market at issue or in another market,63 but 
that does not extend to effects upon society at large. Allowing 
non-competition social benefits to justify losses of consumer 
welfare obviously harms consumers; so, too, does using non-
competition social harms to deny benefits to consumers. 
Therefore, competition enforcers and courts must be careful to 
 
59 European Commission Press Release IP/00/148, Commission 
Approves an Agreement to Improve Energy Efficiency of Washing Machines 
(Feb. 11, 2000), https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-00-
148_en.htm?locale=en [https://perma.cc/7J4H-J6Z9]. 
60 Commission Decision 2000/475, 2000 O.J. (L 187) 5. 
61 Id. at 5 (discussing recoupment in nine to forty months). 
62 Id. at 6. 
63 But see United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) 
(holding “anticompetitive effects in one market” cannot be justified by 
“procompetitive consequences in another”); U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010) (“Agencies 
consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse 
the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market . . . .”). 
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distinguish between qualitative effects that affect consumer 
welfare, on the one hand, and on the other, broader public 
interest considerations that affect consumers and non-
consumers alike.    
This has long been the practice in all but a few 
jurisdictions. As Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim 
recently stated in connection with the Antitrust Division’s 
investigation of an agreement among four automobile 
manufacturers and the State of California concerning 
emissions standards: “The loftiest of purported motivations do 
not excuse anti-competitive collusion among rivals.”64  That, 
however, does not mean antitrust analysis should focus 
exclusively upon measurable price effects. To the contrary, 
antitrust analysis should incorporate qualitative effects to the 
extent that is practical, and the tools discussed below can aid 
antitrust practitioners, agencies, and courts in doing so.  
III. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY RULEMAKING 
CAN INFORM THE BALANCING OF 
UNQUANTIFIED HARMS OR BENEFITS  
Ever since President Ronald Reagan required executive 
branch agencies to do formal cost-benefit analyses before 
issuing significant regulations,65 federal agencies have been 
confronted with the task of accounting for costs and benefits 
that are difficult to quantify,66 such as changes (up or down) 
 
64 Makan Delrahim,  DOJ Antitrust Division: Popular Ends Should Not 




65  Exec. Order No. 12,291, Federal Regulation, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).  
Some regulatory impact analysis is also required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 852 (1970), the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164, 1164 (1980), 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, 
50, and the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 
2812, 2825. 
66 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809, 1819–23 (2017); see also Cass R. 
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in environmental pollution, or are inherently unquantifiable, 
such as effects on human dignity.67 Agencies’ need for 
analytical tools to deal with these challenges has elicited from 
academic and other sources a number of increasingly 
sophisticated methods for quantifying previously 
unquantified effects, such as incremental improvements in 
human health and the environment, and for taking account of 
unquantifiable but undeniably relevant considerations.68 As 
regulations written by the agencies have been challenged in 
court, the judiciary in turn has been called upon to review 
 
Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1369–70 
(2014). 
67 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
OMB CIRCULAR A-4, at 26–27 (2003); see e.g., Nondiscrimination on the 
Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 
56,164, 56,169 (Sept. 15, 2010) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
68 See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, BENEFIT-COST 
ANALYSIS GUIDANCE FOR DISCRETIONARY GRANT PROGRAMS 5–6 (2018), 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/office-
policy/transportation-policy/14091/benefit-cost-analysis-guidance-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/66GE-MWEL]; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF POLICY, 
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES (2014), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-08/documents/ee-0568-
50.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB5S-A8Q9].  See also JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE 
TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 255–59 (6th ed., 2018) (discussing the 
evolution of requirements for regulatory analysis, including best practices 
recommended for agencies by the Office of Management and Budget under 
the Bush and Obama Administrations); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE 
OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2017 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT (2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WE86-CZ3U]; Douglas A. Kysar, Politics by Other 
Meanings: A Comment on “Retaking Rationality Two Years Later” 48 HOUS. 
L. REV. 43, 46–47 (2011) (analyzing “areas of improvement in the practice 
of cost-benefit analysis” while recognizing the limits of current tools 
available to estimate health and environmental effects of regulations); Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1369 
(2014) (recommending agencies engage in breakeven analysis when 
quantification is impossible). 
2_2019.3_GINSBURG (DO NOT DELETE) 12/25/2019  11:20 PM 
No. 3:824] BALANCING UNQUANTIFIED HARMS AND BENEFITS 839 
agencies’ efforts.69 Executive and judicial review of agency 
rulemaking involving unquantified costs or benefits therefore 
provides useful illustrations that can help antitrust agencies 
and courts approach the problem of balancing 
incommensurable effects in antitrust cases. 
A. Executive Review 
To be sure, agency analyses of unquantified benefits is far 
from universal.  Faced with costs and benefits of a proposed 
regulation that are difficult to quantify, some agencies do not 
make even a rudimentary effort to consider the likely effects 
of the regulation.70 Agencies that have made the effort to take 
account of unquantified costs and benefits have, however, 
built a set of tools to inform their analyses upon which the 
antitrust agencies and courts hearing antitrust cases can now 
draw.71    
The current Executive Order laying out the process for 
regulatory review directs agencies to “include both 
quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be 
usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and 
benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless 
 
69 See infra notes 82–91 and accompanying text.  See also Caroline 
Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis, 22 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 575 (2015). 
70 See e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits 
and the Problem of Regulation under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 
104 (2016) (estimating more than 74% of regulations analyzed by the 
authors included relevant costs or benefits the agency could not quantify); 
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809, 1858–59 (2017) (“Sometimes, however, 
regulations are designed to protect third parties or otherwise to promote 
moral values, and agencies have struggled to quantify their benefits; often 
they ignore them.”); CURTIS W. COPELAND, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND 
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (2013), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copeland%20Final%20
BCA%20Report%204-30-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P8Q-TBGE]. 
71 Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency 
Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 640–41 (2014) (describing an iterative 
process between agencies and the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs to develop guidelines for cost-benefit analysis).  
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essential to consider.”72 The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) in the Office of Management and 
Budget (the “OMB”), which runs the regulatory review 
process, directs agencies to take unquantified costs and 
benefits into account by “present[ing] any relevant 
quantitative information along with a description of the 
unquantified effects, such as ecological gains, improvements 
in quality of life, and aesthetic beauty.”73 Including similar 
information about qualitative effects of a business practice or 
a merger could improve the ability of antitrust practitioners—
and consequently, antitrust agencies and courts—to account 
for qualitative benefits in their analysis. 
Agencies have invested in the quantification of benefits 
that are difficult to monetize, such as the value of a human 
life.74 The Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) has 
based its valuation of a statistical life upon studies of 
individuals’ revealed preferences, such as the additional 
wages people demand to take up riskier occupations.75 The 
EPA has used this value of a statistical life in cost-benefit 
analyses of environmental regulations, such as the value of 
 
72 Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 3 C.F.R. 
638 (1993) (amended and modified but not withdrawn by Exec. Order No. 
13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012) 
and Exec. Order No. 13,771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9340 (Jan. 30, 2017)).  
73 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
CIRCULAR A-4, at 27 (2003). 
74 See e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF POLICY, supra note 68 at 11-
3.  See also W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical 
Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. 
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: 
Estimates with Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29 
(2004). 
75 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF POLICY, supra note 68.  See also 
Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 
1423, 1436–37 (discussing methodologies supporting valuations of a 
statistical life used by the EPA and Department of Transportation in cost-
benefit analysis). 
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deaths avoided by reducing particulate emissions under the 
Clean Air Act.76 
To ensure agencies take into account as many unquantified 
costs and benefits as possible, the OMB recommends that 
agencies use a “break-even analysis” to aid their 
decisionmaking.77 For example, the Civil Rights Division of 
the DoJ used a break-even analysis to resolve a difficult 
comparison of costs and benefits in its analysis of new 
standards requiring increased space in restrooms to facilitate 
access for people in wheelchairs.78 The agency recognized the 
quantified costs outweighed the quantified benefits of the 
rule, but concluded that the unquantifiable benefits of 
“enhanced independence, and the avoidance of stigma and 
humiliation” would be “quite high.”79 But that was not an 
unsupported statement. The break-even analysis had shown 
that costs in excess of quantified benefits would be “under 5 
cents per visit.”80 The DoJ reasoned, “based on its experience 
and informed judgment, that 5 cents substantially 
understates the value people with the relevant disabilities 
would place on these benefits.”81 The DoJ performed a similar 
break-even analysis in its regulation implementing the Prison 
Rape Elimination Act.82 The National Highway Traffic Safety 
 
76 Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine 
Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals 76 Fed. Reg. 
48,208, 48,311–15 (Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 
97). 
77 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 73, at 2. 
78 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local 
Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,169 (Sept. 15, 2010) (codified 
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
79 Id. at 56,170.  
80 Id. (estimating per visit costs based upon the yearly amount of excess 
costs divided by the estimated number of yearly restroom visits by people 
with disabilities who would benefit from the rule). 
81 Id.  
82 The DoJ first estimated the benefits of preventing sexual assault at 
$310,000 to $480,000, reflecting the tangible losses (medical expenses and 
lost wages) as well as intangible losses (pain, suffering, and reduced quality 
of life) valued on the basis of jury awards to compensate crime victims for 
pain and suffering.  It then calculated that only 1,671 sexual assaults (or 
less than 1% of the annual sexual assaults in prisons) would have to be 
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Administration (“NHTSA”) also used break-even analysis to 
evaluate the potential benefits of a rule mandating back up 
cameras in cars insofar as they would save parents from 
running over and killing their own children.83 
B. Judicial Review 
Courts have upheld agency regulations that were based in 
part upon consideration of unquantified costs or benefits. 
They have also, however, placed limits upon agencies’ ability 
to evade a rigorous cost-benefit analysis by using unquantified 
harms or benefits to justify new regulations. Administrative 
law cases can not only help guide antitrust practitioners 
looking to incorporate regulatory quantification tools into 
their arguments; they can also help courts evaluate those 
arguments when considering unquantified effects in antitrust 
cases.   
A court considering a regulation the issuing agency 
justified in whole or in part by invoking unquantified benefits 
may look into the basis for the agency’s claim that the benefit 
has substantial value and consider the difficulty involved in 
quantifying it. In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the 
Supreme Court upheld a regulation based entirely upon a 
qualitative benefit, the protection of children from indecent 
speech, against the claim the regulation was arbitrary and 
capricious because the agency had failed to quantify the 
potential benefits of preventing children’s exposure to 
 
prevented in order for the benefits of the regulation to fully offset its costs.  
National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 37,106, 37,110–11, 37,188–89 (June 20, 2012) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 
115). 
83 NHTSA estimated the cost of each death that would be prevented by 
the rule, between $11.8 and $19.7 million, exceeded the value of a statistical 
life usually used by the agency. NHTSA’s analysis suggested that if 
preventing tragic accidents in which parents ran over their own children 
was worth $65 to $79 per vehicle then the costs of the regulation would be 
justified. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rearview Mirrors; 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Low-Speed Vehicles Phase-In 
Reporting Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,186, 76,238 (Dec. 7, 2010) (codified 
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585). 
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“fleeting expletives.”84 The Court explained that, while it 
would not hesitate to “set aside agency action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act because of failure to adduce 
empirical data that can readily be obtained[,]” it would not 
fault the FCC for failing to “obtain[] the unobtainable.”85 
Requiring the FCC to quantify that harm in order to protect 
children would make “a nullity” of the statute charging the 
FCC with that task.86 The Court also noted that it had 
previously held a regulation of otherwise protected expression 
was justified by the “government’s interest in the well-being 
of its youth[,]” despite having “no quantifiable measure of the 
harm caused by the [indecent] language.”87   
In contrast, some courts have held agencies to account for 
failing to quantify costs or benefits when the agency could 
have done more.88  Perhaps one of the best-known examples is 
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.89 In that case, the Fifth 
Circuit vacated an EPA regulation banning several asbestos 
 
84 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519–20 (2009). 
85 Id. at 519 (citation omitted). 
86 Id.  
87 Id. at 519–520 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 
(1978)). See also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (likening the balancing of monetary costs against the unquantifiable 
benefits of increasing transparency relating to conflict minerals to an 
“apples-to-bricks comparison”), rev’d on other grounds, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014); Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
88 In addition, one court chastised the Department of the Interior for 
failing to take into account qualitative benefits, such as the value people 
derive from protecting a natural resource, such as a lake or mountain. Ohio 
v. U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 438, 462–63 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(vacating in part the Department of Interior rule implementing the 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 because it failed to account for the 
existence and option values of natural resources in its hierarchy of 
methodologies to estimate the value of damaged natural resources).  But see 
Denis Swords, Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior: A 
Contingent Step Forward For Environmentalists, 51 LA. L. REV. 1347, 
1367–70 (1991) (arguing the D.C. Circuit misinterpreted CERCLA when 
determining that non-use values, such as the existence of a natural 
resource, must be taken into account when evaluating environmental 
damages). 
89 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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products in part because the EPA had relied upon but failed 
to quantify the benefits of the regulation; the EPA justified 
the costs of banning additional asbestos products that were 
not fully offset by the quantified benefits of the regulation by 
relying upon the unquantified value of those lives potentially 
saved by the regulation more than thirteen years in the 
future. The court recognized “[u]nquantified benefits can, at 
times, permissibly tip the balance in close cases” but they 
“cannot . . . be used to effect a wholesale shift on the balance 
beam.”90 The regulation was vacated based upon the EPA’s 
failure to support its conclusion with substantial evidence and 
to consider less burdensome alternatives, as required by the 
Toxic Substances Control Act.  
Courts have also vacated regulations based upon an 
agency’s failure to quantify costs. In Chamber of Commerce v. 
SEC, although the D.C. Circuit agreed with the SEC’s decision 
not to do an empirical study of the benefits of increasing the 
minimum percentage of independent members on the boards 
of mutual funds, it vacated the regulation based upon the 
SEC’s failure even to study the costs it was imposing.91 
“[U]ncertainty may limit what the Commission can do, but it 
does not excuse the Commission from its statutory obligation 
to do what it can to apprise itself—and hence the public and 
the Congress—of the economic consequences of a proposed 
regulation before it decides whether to adopt the measure.”92 
In the same vein, in Business Roundtable v. SEC, the D.C. 
Circuit vacated another SEC rule because the agency, among 
other flaws, had “failed adequately to quantify the certain 
costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified.”93  
These judicial admonitions to quantify costs and benefits 
where possible, or where directed by statute to do so, resemble 
the best practices laid out by the Office of Management and 
Budget in its Circular A-4 directing agencies to quantify what 
they can in a cost-benefit analysis in order to aid in OIRA’s 
 
90 Id. at 1219. 
91 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
92 Id. at 144.  
93 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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evaluation of the rule.  Surely the antitrust agencies, each of 
which has several dozen Ph.D. economists on its staff, can be 
expected to do as well as other agencies in quantifying the 
likely effects of a merger or practice subject to the rule of 
reason. Of course, there will be some effects that simply defy 
quantification, even in the form of a rough estimate, but it is 
important to minimize the number of harms and benefits that 
are not accounted for in the analysis. 
IV. PROPOSAL TO HELP INFORM BALANCING OF 
UNQUANTIFIED HARMS AND BENEFITS  
Let me connect this discussion back to the goals of 
antitrust that motivated President Taft in his day and 
continue to drive enforcement of the Sherman Act in ours. 
Meeting the challenge of balancing qualitative harms or 
benefits in an antitrust case is not a reason to depart from the 
consumer welfare standard. On the contrary, this balancing 
exercise requires an evidence-based approach to incorporating 
into the consumer welfare standard those qualitative effects—
both anticompetitive harms and procompetitive benefits—of a 
restraint of trade.   
Inherent in this task is the requirement for a party or an 
agency that relies upon a qualitative harm or benefit to 
quantify those effects that can be quantified and to provide 
evidence to substantiate the value of the potential harm or 
benefit. For a claimed competitive harm or benefit that 
remains unquantified, the decisionmaker should demand both 
a convincing showing that the magnitude of the effect cannot 
be quantified and a sound theoretical basis for nonetheless 
believing the effect will be real and substantial.  
The regulatory toolkit could be useful, for example, when 
an antitrust agency is evaluating a claim that a merger will 
benefit innovation. The agency might demand from the 
parties evidence regarding the probability of increased 
innovation, examples of similar mergers realizing similar 
efficiencies, and proof of the parties’ incentive to pass on 
savings to consumers.   
In cases where an agency is making a prediction about the 
harm to innovation owing to a restraint or a proposed merger, 
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these tools could increase the transparency and rigor of its 
analysis. For example, in the consent decree approving the 
Roche-Genentech merger, the FTC required relief in markets 
where it would be several years until the products the 
companies were developing could compete. Discounting the 
potential harm by the likelihood that, but for the merger, both 
these products would eventually come to market would more 
precisely estimate the potential harms of the merger. 
Additional information about the availability of other, similar 
drugs either in the market or under development by other 
companies could also provide helpful guidance about the 
potential harm to consumers. Ultimately, including this 
information could not only improve the agency’s own analysis, 
but also provide guidance to companies working to evaluate 
antitrust risk in future transactions.  
Break-even analysis and valuations of morbidity or 
mortality could also be used in hospital merger cases, for 
example, by balancing harms quantified by the agency with 
benefits quantified by the defendants. The defendants in the 
Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s 
Health System, Ltd. hospital merger case tried to rebut the 
FTC’s allegation that the merger would increase prices by 
arguing generally that the merger would also increase 
quality.94 St. Luke’s itself estimated the increase in prices 
would cost consumers an additional $1.65 million per year.95 
A break-even analysis would look to qualitative benefits, such 
as the claimed improvement in the quality of primary care. If 
the defendants could show the improvement would save even 
one additional life per year, the defendants could use the value 
of a statistical life (about $10 million) to show the benefits of 
the merger to some patients would dwarf the costs of the 
 
94 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 
Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015).  
95 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 
Ltd., Nos. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at 
*12 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014) (“St. Luke’s own analysis projected that it could 
gain an extra $750,000 through hospital-based billing from Saltzer from 
commercial payers for lab work and $900,000 extra for diagnostic 
imaging.”), aff’d 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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merger to others;96 there would be an increase, not a decrease, 
in consumer welfare if the merger were approved.  
Some cases, including some cases discussed above, ask 
courts and agencies to balance qualitative benefits or harms 
that are not just difficult to quantify, they are inherently 
unquantifiable. In balancing qualitative effects, it is 
important to recognize the limitations of any attempt to 
measure or even estimate the value of the harm or benefit. For 
example, in adopting regulations concerning prison rape and 
restroom facilities, respectively, the DoJ was able to take into 
account the constitutional rights of prisoners and the dignity 
of persons in wheelchairs by doing a break-even analysis even 
though those values are inherently unquantifiable.97   
Across these different efforts to account for qualitative 
harms and benefits the standard of evaluation should remain 
consumer welfare. Evaluating the qualitative costs and 
benefits is not an invitation to look beyond the effects on 
consumers and to incorporate the effects on the public at 
large. As practitioners consider using these tools to better 
account for qualitative effects in antitrust investigations and 
trials, they must be careful to focus upon consumer welfare as 
the lodestar guiding their efforts; the antitrust agencies will 
properly disregard claims that a business practice or a merger 
will benefit the general public. Further quantification is a step 
toward a more precise accounting under, not a departure 
from, the consumer welfare standard.   
Agencies can take that step forward by quantifying aspects 
of hard-to-measure harms when bringing a complaint; for 
example, when assessing harms to innovation an agency 
might do a more rigorous analysis of the likelihood that 
 
96 This example uses an approximate valuation of a statistical life for 
illustrative purposes.  See W. Kip Viscusi, The VSL Is Not Too High, REG., 
Winter 2018-2019, at 2, available at  
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2018/12/reg
ulation-v41n4-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDM8-Q89T].   
97 National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 
77 Fed. Reg. 37106, 37,110–11, 37,188–89 (June 20, 2012) (codified at 28 
C.F.R. pt. 115); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and 
Local Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,169 (Sept. 15, 2010) 
(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
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research will be successful in developing a product. A party 
defending a restraint can take that step forward by 
quantifying the value of an improvement in quality or service 
it claims in justification. Lastly, courts can help all parties 
take these steps forward by embracing the use in antitrust 
cases of tools developed for regulatory cost-benefit analysis.   
 
